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BANKERS BEWARE: LIABILITY OF
LENDING INSTITUTIONS UNDER
SUPERFUND
John M. Van Lieshout*
INTRODUCTION

Lending institutions have long viewed themselves as outside the
ever-widening scope of liability for the high cost of cleaning up hazardous waste disposal sites under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA),
popularly known as Superfund. 1 Such a belief seemed well-founded;
although responsibility under CERCLA is imposed on the "owners
or operators" of hazardous waste facilities, 2 a specific exception to
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Glassner, Tehan, Clancy & Taitelman, S.C., Milwaukee, Wiscongin.
I. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675
(West Supp. 1988)). Cleanup of all hazardous waste sites in the United States has been estimated to cost $23 billion. United States Environmental Protection Agency Office of Solid
Waste and Emergency Response, Extent of the Hazardous Release Problem and Future Funding Needs, CERCLA § 301 (a)(1)(C) Study, Final Report (Dec. 1984).
2. CERCLA imposes liability upon four categories of what have come to be called potentially responsible parties ("PRPs"): present owners and operators of a facility, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 9607(a)(1) (West Supp. 1988); owners or operators of a facility at the time hazardous substances were disposed of at the facility, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(2) (West Supp. 1988); persons
who arranged for disposal of a hazardous substance at a facility, also known as "generators,"
42 U.S.C.A. 9607(a)(3)(West Supp. 1988): and parties who accepted hazardous substances
for transportation to facilities selected by the party and at which there was a release or
threatened release of a hazardous substance. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4) (West Supp. 1988).
Parties in this last category are generally referred to as "transporters".
"Facility" is defined by CERCLA at § 101(9), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(9) (West Supp.
1988). Like most definitions found in CERCLA §101, "facility" is defined very broadly, and
generally refers to any place where hazardous substances have come to be located. 42
U.S.C.A. § 9601(9)(B) (West Supp. 1988). For example, while most would associate a facility
with a dump or landfill, courts have also found facilities in places such as trailer parks, United
States v. Metate Asbestos Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1143, 1148 (D. Ariz. 1984), and dragstrips,
New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 295-96 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
"Hazardous substances" are defined in CERCLA §101(14), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(14)
(West Supp. 1988) by reference to lists of substances defined as hazardous in other environmental legislation such as the Clean Water Act and the Toxic Substances Control Act. 42
U.S.C.A. § 9601(14)(A), (D) (West Supp. 1988). This "list of lists" encompasses approxi-
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CERCLA liability was carved out for a person "who, without participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of
ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or
facility." 3 Lenders concluded that the "security interest" identified
in the exception referred to the mortgages they held on properties
affected by hazardous waste disposal. Consequently, lending institutions appeared to have little to fear from CERCLA.
However, two recent decisions cast doubt on the invulnerability
of lending institutions to CERCLA.4 While the rulings seem at times
contradictory, they deliver a common message: lending institutions
can no longer assume that their status as secured creditors renders
them immune to CERCLA liability. To fully understand the impact
of the decisions on the lending community, it is necessary to review
the regulatory and legislative origins of CERCLA, as well as the
distinct fact situations under which the cases arose.
I.

FEDERAL LEGISLATION OF WASTE DISPOSAL

All federal solid waste legislation is of recent vintage. Prior to
the early-1950's, regulation of waste disposal sites was primarily the
province of local health and safety officials. By 1964, only two states
had developed statewide programs for solid waste management.'
Thirty-one had no plan whatsoever. 6
With the passage of the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965, the
federal government first entered the scene. 7 National participation,
however, was to be limited: allowances were made for federal technical and financial assistance, but disposal of solid waste remained a
state and local responsibility. 8 Nevertheless, due principally to the
funding made available under the Solid Waste Disposal Act, by
1975 forty-eight states had adopted some form of waste management
law and all fifty states had issued solid waste disposal regulations.9
mately 717 substances. 51 Fed. Reg. 34,534 (1986). However, CERCLA exempts crude oil
and natural gas, as well as other petroleum by-products, from the definition of hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(14) (West Supp. 1988).
3. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A) (West 1986 and Supp. 1988).
4. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. Sept.
4, 1985); United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
5. See Kovacs & Klucsik, The New Federal Role in Solid Waste Management: The
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 3 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 205, 213 (1977),
6. Id.
7. Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 997 (1965).
8. Kovacs & Klucsik, supra note 5, at 214.
9. Id.
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The Solid Waste Disposal Act was amended by the Resource
Recovery Act of 1970 to expand the federal role in solid waste management.10 The Resource Recovery Act of 1970 mandated the enactment of guidelines for solid waste management and authorized federal grants for the construction of facilities that would recover usable
materials from waste." The recycling efforts were financed by the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), a federal agency created in 1970 to take over the functions of the Bureau of Solid Waste
Management, a division of the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare."
The federal government assumed direct control over solid waste
disposal with the enactment of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 ("RCRA").' 3 The congressional findings accompanying RCRA state that "while the collection and disposal of solid
wastes should continue to be primarily the function of State, regional
and local agencies, the problems of waste disposal ... have become a
matter national in scope and in concern and necessitate Federal action." 4 Congress expressed particular concern in the preamble to
RCRA of risks to human health and the environment due to inadequate controls on hazardous waste management. 5 As a result,
RCRA directs EPA to identify types, quantities, and concentrations
of hazardous waste and to establish minimum standards applicable
to all who generate, transport, treat, store, or dispose of such
material."6
Congress imposed a deadline of eighteen months from the passage of RCRA for the promulgation of EPA hazardous waste standards. 7 Three years later, however, regulations had been proposed
10. Pub. L. No. 91-512, 84 Stat. 1227.
II. See Comment, Inactive or Abandoned Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites: Coping
With a Costly Past, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1709, 1715 (1980).
12. Kovacs & Klucsik, supra note 5, at 215; see also, Comment, supra note 11, at 1712
n.23.
13. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6987 (West
Supp. 1988)).
14. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6901(a)(4) (West 1986).
15. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6901(b)(5) (West Supp. 1988).
16. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6921-6924 (West Supp. 1988). RCRA also requires that a permit
be issued for the treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous wastes. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6925
(West Supp. 1988).
17. See Hazardous Waste Disposal Report; Together With Additional and Separate
Views by the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1979) [hereinafter 1979 Oversight Report].
The 1979 Oversight Report notes that while Congress may have been "unrealistic" in giving
EPA only 18 months to develop national standards for the disposal of hazardous wastes, "there
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but not enacted."8 In the interim, the nation was faced with a disaster that brought to the fore the inadequacies of the existing legislation. During the summer of 1978, 236 families living near Love Canal in Niagara Falls, New York, were evacuated and permanently
relocated because of exposure to toxic chemicals buried in a disposal
site immediately adjacent to their homes.1 9 Before the relocation
could occur, the residents had suffered disproportionately high incidences of miscarriages, birth defects, skin disorders, heart problems,
and respiratory ailments.20 As a result, a massive cleanup effort was
begun. By 1979, the costs had exceeded $27 million.2 1
The Love Canal disaster made clear the shortcomings of
RCRA. When the situation was discovered, the site was owned by
the City of Niagara Falls Board of Education and local residents.2 2
Hooker Chemical Company seemed at least partially responsible for
the problem, since it originally owned and operated the site.2" However, Hooker alleged that its disposal practices were sufficient under
the standards in effect at the time and therefore contested its responsibility for the huge cleanup bill.2" Furthermore, neither the City
Board of Education nor the residents of the area had the funds to
finance the cleanup.2 5 As a result, the State of New York and federal government were forced to spend millions of dollars in tax revenues to reduce the dangers posed by the site.2"
Across the country, the problem was multiplying. In Shepherdsville, Kentucky, 20,000 to 30,000 barrels of discarded, leaking and
unlabeled wastes were uncovered in a lowland dubbed the "Valley of
can be no excuse for EPA's failure to promulgate regulations in the nearly three years since
the statute was enacted." Id.
18. 45 Fed. Reg. 33, 136 (1980). Additionally, the first case under RCRA was not filed
until December, 1978, over two years after the enactment of RCRA. 1979 Oversight Report,
supra note, 17 at 37.
19. Comment, supra note 11, at 1712; see also Hazardous and Toxic Waste Disposal:
Joint Hearings Before the Subcomms. on Environmental Pollution and Resource Protection
of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 108, 126-28
(part 1) (1979) [hereinafter 1979 Envt'l Hearings].
20. Comment, supra note 1I, at 1712. See also 1979 Envt'l Hearings, supra note 19, at
116-20.
21. 1979 Oversight Report, supra note 17, at 5. "It [was] estimated that a properly
secured disposal site would have cost only $ 4 million (in 1979 dollars) in 1952 when the [Love
Canal] site was closed." Id.
22. 1979 Oversight Report, supra note 17, at 25.
23. Id.
24. 1979 Envi'l Hearings, supra note 19, at 292.
25. 1979 Oversight Report, supra note 17, at 25.
26. Id.
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the Drums."2 7 The owner, who had inherited the site from her deceased husband, was judgment proof from the enormous cost of remedying the situation. 28 In New Jersey, more than 40,000 barrels of
chemicals were found on the grounds of the Chemical Control Company. 29 When Chemical Control went bankrupt, the State of New
Jersey was stuck with a bill of $10 million for the cost of cleanup. 0
The root of the problem lay in the enabling language of RCRA.
While it empowered EPA to abate discharges of hazardous wastes
into the air or water, the wording of RCRA was prospective and
focused solely on the control of present and future hazardous waste
disposal. 3 ' Consequently, RCRA was not well-suited to remedy the
effects of past disposal practices.3 2 In drafting the Act, Congress
33
simply did not anticipate the problem.
The abandoned site-an inactive hazardous waste disposal or
storage facility that cannot be traced to a specific owner-created
another dilemma. Although § 7003 of RCRA authorized EPA to
bring suit to direct an owner or other responsible party to take remedial action to prevent or abate an imminent and substantial danger
to human health or the environment, 34 RCRA was only effective in
those situations where the owner or responsible party was identifiable
and financially able to afford the remedy.3 5 Therefore, if the perpetrator was unknown, could not be located, could not afford cleanup,
or declared bankruptcy and walked away from the site, RCRA §
36
7003 was useless.
27. Id. at 11, 24; 1979 Envi'l Hearings, supra note 19, at 33. One estimate put the
number of barrels at the site at "up to 100,000." See Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act Authorization Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Transportation and Commerce of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 249-54 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as 1979 RCRA Authorization Hearing].
28. 1979 Oversight Report, supra note 17, at 24.
29. See id. at 5.
30. Id. at 5, 24.
31. Id.at 47.
32. 1979 RCRA Authorization Hearings,supra note 27, at 54 (statement of Thomas C.
Jorling, Assistant Administrator for Water and Waste Management, United States Environmental Protection Agency).
33. 1979 Oversight Report, supra note 17, at 47.
34. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6973 (West 1986 and Supp. 1988).
35. 1979 Envt'l Hearings, supra note 19, at 43. But see United States v. Waste Indus.,
Inc., in which the court ruled that RCRA § 7003 [42 U.S.C.A. § 6973 (West Supp. 1988)]
could apply to owners and operators of an inactive landfill site. Any other decision, the court
concluded, would interpret CERCLA as repealing RCRA, a result that Congress did not intend. 734 F.2d 159, 168 (4th Cir. 1984).
36. See 1979 Envt'l Hearings, supra note 19, at 43.
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With these concerns in mind, Congress set out to develop a new
legislative scheme for environmental liability. At the outset, it was
clear that the scope of responsibility had to be widened. In this way,
the enforcers of the law could avoid the dilemma faced by the State
of New Jersey in its attempt to recover from six present and former
owners of an abandoned site: in each instance the defendants had
stated "I didn't do it; it was the guy before me.""7 As an answer,
strict liability was proposed for both past and present owners of disposal sites.3 8
Liability without regard to fault was based on the premise that
the handling of hazardous substances is an inherently ultrahazardous
activity that involves the risk of serious harm to the public which
cannot be eliminated completely even through application of the
most stringent precautions.3 9 Without such broad-based liability,
proof problems with regard to liability-as in the Chemical Control
case-were thought to be inevitable. " ' Furthermore, the imposition
of strict liability was intended to serve as a deterrent for owners and
operators of hazardous waste facilities."'
The responsibility of past owners was also considered in response to the problem of abandoned sites. Love Canal proved that
seeking relief against the present owner was not always appropriate
since the present owner may be completely unrelated to the prior
dumping.42 The only way to ensure effective enforcement was to legislate liability for past and present site owners.4 3
At the same time, however, critics of the proposed legislation
stated that its guiding philosophy was reflected in the statement that
''government is perfectly prepared to punish the innocent for the sins
of the guilty." 4 The broad-based nature of strict liability was char37. 1979 Oversight Report, supra note 17, at 25.
38. A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (Superfund). Pub. L. No. 96-510, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 307
(Volume 2) (1983) [hereinafter 2 CERCLA Leg. Hist.].
39. Id. at 307.
40. Id. The Wildlife Federation concurred in this opinion, asserting that without strict
liability, the possibility of recovery under the present legal system for other than initial
cleanup costs would be "very remote." 1979 Envt7 Hearings, supra note 19, at 754-755.
41. 2 CERCLA Leg. Hist., supra note 38, at 307. Sprinkled throughout the debate on
strict liability are numerous references to Rylands v. Fletcher, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (1865),
rev'd L.R. I Ex. 265, aff'd L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868), the historic case out of which the concept
of ultrahazardous activity arose. Id. at 347-350.
42. 2 CERCLA Leg. Hist., supra note 38, at 307.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 98.
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acterized as flying in the "face of fundamental fairness and equity ' 45
and viewed as giving EPA access to the deep pockets of whatever
company had the money to pay, regardless of its degree of culpability. 4" Concern was also voiced that the liability scheme blew the
problem "out of proportion" and extended the punishment instead of
the cleanup."' One Congressman dramatically concluded that "legislation like the Superfund will mandate that the injured be compensated by the innocent." 48 It was against this conflicting background
that CERCLA was passed into law on December 4, 1980.11
CERCLA retains most of the proposals by which RCRA was
sought to be remedied. To rectify the problem of responsibility for
abandoned sites, CERCLA § 101(2)(A) provides that any person
who owned, operated, or otherwise controlled activities at an abandoned facility immediately prior to such abandonment is deemed to
be the owner or operator of the site. 50 This characterization is important insofar as CERCLA imposes liability upon past and present
owners and operators of hazardous waste facilities.5"
Present site owners are subject to a type of "absolute liability":52 they are responsible even if they never disposed of any hazardous waste at the site and acquired ownership years after hazardous waste was disposed of at the site."3 The liability of former
owners of hazardous waste sites is more limited. Former owners are
45. See id. at 99.
46. Id. at 98.
47. See id.
48. Id. at 247 (Statement of Rep. Ronald E. Paul, R. - Texas).
49. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980)(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9675 (West
Supp. 1988).
50. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A) (West Supp. 1988). The Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act ("SARA"), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986), also imposes
duties on former owners. SARA § 101 (35)(C), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(C) (West Supp.
1988) states that "if the defendant obtained actual knowledge of the release or threatened
release of a hazardous substance at such facility when the defendant owned the real property
and then subsequently transferred ownership of the property to another person without disclosing such knowledge, such defendant shall be treated as liable under section 107(a)(4) and no
defense under section 107(b)(l) and no defense under section 107(b)(3) shall be available to
such defendant." Id.
51. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(1) and (2) (West Supp. 1988).
52. See Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1458,
1515-16 (1986) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
53. See Artesian Water Co. v. Governor of New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269,
1280 (D. Del. 1987) aff d in part, revd in part, remanded on other grounds, 851 F.2d 643
(3rd Cir. 1988). See also United States v. Tyson, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1897 (E.D. Pa. Aug.
22, 1986) (current owners liable even if they never operated the site as a hazardous waste
dump and no hazardous wastes were dumped at the site during their term of ownership).
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not held accountable under CERCLA unless they owned the site at
the time hazardous waste was disposed of at the site."'
The liability provisions of CERCLA reflect the intent of its
drafters to adopt a strict liability scheme. Although the terms "strict
liability" are not used in CERCLA,5 5 liability under CERCLA is
defined to be the standard of liability which obtains under § 1321 of
the Clean Water Act.56 It is well settled that strict liability is the
standard of liability which governs the application of § 1321 of the
Clean Water Act. 7
Furthermore, CERCLA's liability section states that it is subject to only three defenses, 58 none of which incorporate any reference
to fault or negligence that could negate an inference of strict liabil54. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(2). See also Cadillac Fairview/California, Inc. v. Dow
Chem. Co., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,376, 20,378 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 5 1984); Developments, supra note 52, at 1515.
55. Both the early House and Senate versions of the proposed CERCLA legislation contained language providing for strict liability. See § 1480, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4(a), 126
Cong. Rec. 30,908, reprinted in I CERCLA Legislative History, supra note 38, at 438-39. As
part of the compromise necessary to effect adoption of the measure, the sponsors removed
specific reference to strict liability. See Note, Generator Liability Under Superfund for Cleanup of Abandoned Hazardous Waste Dumpsites, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1229, 1252-58 (1983).
56. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32).
57. See Steuart Transp. Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 596 F.2d 609, 613 (4th Cir. 1979)
and United States v. LeBoeuf Bros. Towing Co., 621 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
452 U.S. 906 (1981). Nonetheless, defendants in early CERCLA cases insisted that the omission of strict liability in the compromise required courts to impose a negligence standard.
Those arguments failed, however, and the issue appears well settled today. See New York v.
Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp.
1103, 1114 (D.N.J. 1983), afl'd, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Argent Corp.,
14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,497 (D.N.M. May 4, 1984)
58. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(b)(1),(2) and (3) (West 1986 and Supp. 1988):
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a person otherwise
liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or
threat of release of a hazardous substance and the damages resulting therefrom
were caused solely by(I) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the
defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant (except where
the sole contractual arrangement arises from a published tariff and acceptance for
carriage by a common carrier by rail), if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous
substance concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of such hazardous
substance, in light of all relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party and the consequences that could foreseeably result from such acts or omissions; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.
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ity.59 A responsible party is liable under CERCLA unless it can be
proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or threat
of release of a hazardous substance, and the damage resulting therefrom, were caused solely by: (1) an act of war;60 (2) an act of God;"

and/or (3) an act of a third party with whom the defendant had no
contractual relationship."2 In an effort to limit the range of objections to liability, CERCLA provides that its liability scheme is subject "only" to the above-enumerated defenses.6 3
CERCLA does, however, set forth at least one exception to its
strict' liability scheme. CERCLA § 101(20)(A) exempts from the
59. See id. (No case to date has applied the "act of war" defense).
60. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(b)(1) (West Supp. 1988).
61. The "act of God" defense was unsuccessfully asserted in United States v. Stringfellow, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1624 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 1987). In that case, the defendants contended that heavy rainfall could serve as the type of national disaster which constituted an act
of God. However, the court found that rain was not the kind of "exceptional natural phenomena" to which the "narrow act of God defense" applied. Stringfellow, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) at
1630. The court declared that the rains were foreseeable based on normal climatic conditions
and any harm caused by the rain could have been prevented through design of proper drainage
channels.
62. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9706(b)(3) (West Supp. 1988). The third party defense has been the
most frequently employed CERCLA defense. See, e.g., United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 619 F. Supp 162, 236-37 (W.D. Mo. 1985); United States v. Ward, 23 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 1391, 1400 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 9, 1985); and United States v. Tyson, 25 E.R.C. (BNA)
1897, 1906 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 1986). Greater use has not, however, coincided with greater
success on the merits. In most cases, the defense fails due to the defendant's contractual relationship with the allegedly responsible third party. In Ward, for example, a verbal agreement
relating to disposition of PCB fluid was sufficient to create a contractual relationship to void
use of the defense even when the agreement was "never reduced to writing or incorporated in a
company resolution." Ward, 23 Env't Rep. at 1394.
Even when an act occurs which is outside of the scope of a contractual relationship, courts
have denied application of the defense. In Violet v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283 (D.R.I. 1986), a
targeted defendant claimed that its waste was contracted for disposition at a certain Rhode
Island landfill. The transporter deposited the waste at a different landfill, and the latter site
became the subject of a CERCLA cleanup. Despite the contention that this "trans-shipment"
was clearly outside the parameters of the disposal contract, the court refused to invoke the
third-party defense since its specific statutory requirements had not been met. Violet, 648 F.
Supp at 1283.
63. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9706 (a) (West Supp. 1988). Despite this fact, many defendants
interpose non-statutory defenses. Some courts, relying on the "only" in § 107(a), have stricken
these defenses with little discussion. Stringfellow, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) at 1631.
Other courts, however, have rejected this approach. Relying on the statement in CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9606(a) (West 1986) that a court may "grant such relief as the
public interest and the equities of the case may require," courts have allowed the use of equitable defenses such as laches, estoppel and waiver. Conservation Chemical Co., 619 F. Supp. at
204-05. Other defenses going to the constitutionally of CERCLA and procedural defenses such
as failure to join indispensable parties have also been raise, albeit with little success. See generally, Glass, Superfund and SARA: Are There any Defenses Left?, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
385 (1988).
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definition of a liable owner or operator a person who, without partici-

pating in the management of a facility, holds indicia of ownership
primarily to protect his security interest in the facility."" On its surface, this provision appears to be an attempt to mollify the critics of
strict liability insofar as it provides protection for a certain category
of seemingly "innocent" parties.
II.

CASE LAW

As stated above, lending institutions viewed CERCLA with little apprehension as a result of the exception in § 101(20)(A) for
persons holding indicia of ownership to protect a security interest.
Prior to 1985, no authority to the contrary existed, insofar as the

section had not been judicially interpreted.65
However, lenders should have been tipped off by CERCLA's
64. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20(A) (West 1986 and Supp. 1988):
The term "owner or operator" means (i) in the case of a vessel, any person owning,
operating, or chartering by demise, such vessel, (ii) in the case of an onshore facility
or an offshore facility, any person owning or operating such facility, and (iii)
in the case of any facility, any person who owned, operated, or otherwise controlled
activities at such facility immediately beforehand. Such a term does not include a
person, who, without participation in the management of a vessel or facility, holds
indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility.
CERCLA's legislative history makes specific reference to the exception:
"Owner" is defined to include not only those persons who hold title to a vessel or
facility but those who, in the absence of holding a title, possess some equivalent
evidence of ownership. It does not include certain persons possessing indicia of ownership (such as a financial institution) who, without participating in the management or operation of a vessel or facility, hold title either in order to secure a loan or
in connection with a lease financing arrangement under the appropriate banking
laws, rule or regulations . . . For example, a financial institution which held title
primarily to secure a loan but also received tax benefits as the result of holding title
would not be an "owner" as long as it did not participate in the management or
operation of the vessel or facility.
2 CERCLA Leg. Hist., supra note 38, at 546.
65. The issue was briefly mentioned by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of Ohio in T.P. Long Chemical, Inc., 22 Env't Rep (BNA) 1547 (N.D. Ohio
Jan. 3, 1985). The court, in dicta, stated that a secured creditor that had repossessed its collateral pursuant to a security agreement would not be an "owner or operator" as defined by
CERCLA:
The E.P.A. suggest, but does not specifically state, that BancOhio is liable under
CERCLA as an owner or operator .... The court must reject this argument. The
court finds that even if BancOhio had repossessed its collateral pursuant to its security agreement, it would not be an "owner or operator" as defined under CERCLA .
. . . The only possible indicia of ownership that can be attributed to BancOhio is
that which is primarily to protect its security interest. It is undisputed that
BancOhio has not participated in the management of the Long facility. Thus,
BancOhio cannot be held liable as an owner or operator under CERCLA.
22 Env't Rep. (BNA) at 1556.
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legislative history. The intent of the drafters was clear: few, if any,
parties with connections to a hazardous waste site would escape liability. Moreover, if the present owner was without funds to finance
the cleanup, a thorough examination of the chain of title would be
made until a solvent target could be found. As a result, deep pockets
like lending institutions had the most to fear from CERCLA. Two
decisions rendered within six months of each other combined to
make this fear a reality for the lending community.6"
A.

United States v. Mirabile

In United States v. Mirabile, the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania decided an issue of first impression: "how far a secured creditor may go in protecting its financial interests before it can be said to have acted as an owner or operator within the meaning of [CERCLA].1 6 7 The Mirabile decision
discusses this question in the context of three separate loan
transactions.
American Bank & Trust Company of Pennsylvania ("ABT"),
lent a sum of money to Arthur C. Mangels Industries, Inc.
("Mangels") in February of 1973.8 The loan was secured, in part,
by a mortgage on the site of Mangels' paint manufacturing facility. 9
In 1976, Turco Coatings, Inc. ("Turco") acquire 98% of the outstanding shares of Mangels and shortly thereafter began to manufacture paint at the site. 0
Girard Bank ("Girard"), the predecessor-in-interest of Mellon
Bank ("Mellon"), entered into a financing agreement with Turco in
1976 whereby Girard would advance working capital to Turco.7 1
These advances were to be secured by the inventory and assets of
Turco. 72 At an unspecified date thereafter, Turco established an advisory board to oversee its operations. 73 One member of the advisory
board was Brett Sauers, the Girard loan officer initially responsible
66. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,994 (E.D. Pa. 1985); United States
v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F.Supp 573 (D.Md. 1986).
67. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,995.
68. Id. at 20,996.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. The board was established by the president of Turco, Robert Horstmann, who
was also brought into the case as a third-party defendant. Id.
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for the Turco account. 4
In July of 1979, the Small Business Administration ("the
SBA") lent $150,000 to Turco. 75 The loan was secured as follows: a
second lien security interest in Turco machinery and equipment, a
second lien on inventory and accounts receivable, and a second mortgage on the real estate. 76 However, Turco filed for bankruptcy under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in January of 1980. 77 All operations at the site in December of 1980 were ceased by Turco.78 Sauers
was replaced by Peter McWilliams as the loan officer in charge of
Girard increased its monitoring of Turco's
the Turco account and
79
condition.
financial
In 1981, Turco's Chapter 11 petition was dismissed by the
bankruptcy court.8 0 ABT proceeded with a foreclosure of its mortgage on the site and Girard, with the approval of the bankruptcy
court, took possession of Turco's inventory.8 1 A percentage of the
inventory was disposed of through private sales, and the remainder
was sold at a public auction in May 1981.82 On August 21, 1981, the
sheriff's sale in the ABT foreclosure action was held.8 3 ABT was the
highest bidder but, less than four months later, assigned its bid to
Thomas and Anna Mirabile ("the Mirabiles"), who then accepted a
sheriff's deed to the property. 4
74. Id.
75. Id. The loan was to be applied to "'specified debts." Id.
76. Id. The SBA also required a pledge of stock to secure its loan. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. The record does not disclose the ground for dismissal. See, however, In re Mattiace Indus., Inc., 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1212 (Bkrtcy. E.D.N.Y. July 31, 1987) in which a
bankruptcy petition was dismissed for the following reasons:
[Tihe court will not allow the debtor to continue operation under the protection of
the bankruptcy court while continuing to dump toxic chemicals polluting the environment. It is implicit that
the legislative intention of Congress was not to permit the operation of a business
for profit that constitutes a threat to the health and welfare of the public, nor that
the bankruptcy court serve as a refuge for Chapter I I polluters.
28 E.R.C. at 1215. For general information on the interplay between CERCLA and the Bankruptcy Code see Klein, Hazardous Waste Liability and the Bankruptcy Code, 10 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 533 (1986); See also Jackson, Kovics and Toxic Wastes in Bankruptcy, 36
STAN. L. REV. 119 (1984).
81. 15 Envt. L. Rep. at 20,996. Turco also consented to Girard's possession of the inventory. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. The court noted that "[b]oth before and after the sale ABT negotiated with
other parties for purchase of the property." Id.
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In the winter of 1981-82, the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources informed the Mirabiles that drums on the site
contained hazardous waste and asked the Mirabiles to remove the
drums.85 The Mirabiles made efforts to consolidate the
drums-which had been scattered about the site-into a warehouse.86 Although they obtained quotations from firms as to the cost
of removing the drums, no drums were actually removed."
In February of 1983, the EPA visited the Turco site.88 Approximately 550 drums of waste from the paint manufacturing process
were found stored in a warehouse.8 9 Many of the drums were in a
deteriorated state and there were signs, including the residue of fires,
that trespassers had entered the warehouse.9" The EPA concluded,
based upon the inspection of the warehouse and air samples taken at
the time, that immediate removal actions were necessary.9"
The EPA, on February 9, 1983, authorized the use of CERCLA
money for the initiation of immediate action at the site. 2 The
Mirabiles were provided with a final opportunity to rectify the problem and, upon their failure to to do so, the EPA commenced cleanup
on February 11, 1983.13 Thereafter, the United States brought suit
against the Mirabiles to recover cleanup costs in the amount of
$249,792.52. 94 The Mirabiles, in response, joined ABT and Mellon
85. The substances in question included benzene, ethylbenzene, naphthelene, toluene
and mercury. See United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20, 992,
20,993 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985) (This was a companion decision on the motion of the United
States for partial summary judgment on its complaint against Anna and Thomas Mirabile.
The motion was denied based on the Mirabiles' assertion of a CERCLA 107(b)(3) third-party
defense and the factual issues raised with respect to that defense.)
86. 15 Envtl. L Rep. at 20,993.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. An immediate removal action is authorized by CERCLA's National Oil and
Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300 (1987). Removal actions are in the nature of short-term responses to problems requiring immediate attention, 40 C.F.R. § 300.6 (1987), and are limited by SARA to twelve months in duration and
two million dollars in expenditures. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(c)(1) (West Supp. 1988).
Removal actions contrast sharply with remedial actions, CERCLA's other cleanup process. Remedial actions are lengthy and expensive: although estimates seem to vary, one study
determined that the average remedial cleanup took two to three years and cost fourteen million
dollars. Robert Morris Associates, When Your Assets Become Liabilities, 31 (1988).
92. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,993.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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as third-party defendants.95 ABT and Mellon brought a claim
against the United States, based upon the SBA's alleged involvement

in creating the existing conditions at the Turco site, relying on the
alleged involvement of the SBA in creating the conditions existing at

the site. 96
ABT, the SBA and Mellon Bank each filed motions for summary judgment relying on the exception to CERCLA liability in §
101 (20)(A). 9 7 In its ruling on the motions, the court noted that
ABT's involvement at the site presented "the most compelling case"
for the granting of summary judgment.98 ABT had asserted that "its
activities at the site were undertaken merely to protect its security
interest in the property and that it never participated in the manage-

ment of the site." 99 In resolving ABT's motion, the court took into

consideration the actions taken by ABT with respect to the property.
In the period between the sheriff's sale and the assignment of its bid
to the Mirabiles, ABT had: (1) secured the building against vandalism by boarding up windows and changing locks; (2) made inquiries
as to the approximate cost of disposal of various drums located on
the property; and (3) visited the property on various occasions for
the purpose of showing it to prospective purchasers.10
The court indicated that "ABT made no effort to continue
Turco's operations on the property and had foreclosed some eight
months after all operations had ceased." 10 1 In light of these facts,
the court decided that ABT simply could not be deemed to have
95. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Env't Rep. (BNA) 20,994, 20,995 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 4,
1985). ABT and Mellon argued, in essence, that if they were liable, so was the SBA. Id. The
Mirabiles never made a direct claim against the SBA, but raised a defense that the SBA
should have been joined in the action as an indispensable party. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 20,994-95.
98. Id. at 20,996.
99. Id.
100. Id. The court noted that all of these activities occurred "several months after Turco
ceased its operations at the site," thereby implying that ABT was not imposing its will on
Turco. Id. If these acts had taken place while Turco was still doing business, it is submitted
that ABT's control over Turco would have been significant and would lend credence to a claim
that it was a de facto operator of the Turco plant.
101. Id. ABT also contended that it was not an "owner" for purposes of CERCLA §
107(a)(l) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(l)(a) (West Supp. 1988), because under Pennsylvania law it acquired only equitable title to the property by virtue of its successful bid at the
sheriff's foreclosure sale. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,996 (for an overview of the parties upon
whom CERCLA imposes liability, see infra note 2). ABT asserted that it had assigned its
successful bid to the Mirabiles before it was vested with legal title-presumably before its bid
was confirmed by the court in its foreclosure action. Id. The Mirabile court resolved ABT's
liability on other grounds and never ruled on this issue.
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participated in the management of the site. 0 2 Given the "security
interest" exception in § 101(20)(A) of CERCLA, the court stated
that congress had manifested its intent to impose liability [primarily]
upon those who were responsible for and profited from improper disposal practices."'10 3 Therefore, before a secured creditor such as ABT
could be declared liable, the court ruled that "it must, at a minimum, participate in the day-to-day operational aspects of the
site."' 0 In the instant case, the court remarked, "ABT merely foreclosed on the property after all operations had ceased and thereafter
took prudent and routine steps to secure the property against further
depreciation.' ' 0 5 Summary judgment was granted for ABT.'0 ,
The court next considered the responsibility of the SBA with
respect to the property. While the SBA had loaned money to Turco,
it had never become an owner of the property in the same sense as
ABT. 0 7 However, the SBA regulations in effect at the time of its
loan to Turco required that the SBA provide management assistance
to its borrowers.' 0 8 Although no evidence was introduced to prove
that such assistance was ever provided, representatives of the SBA
did visit the Turco site three times during 1981 to monitor liquidation of Turco's assets.' 0 9 In addition, the SBA loan agreement placed
certain restrictions on Turco's financial dealings, and limited the annual compensation of Turco's operating officers. 1 0
The Mirabiles grounded their case against the SBA on the provisions of the loan agreement."' Notwithstanding the duties called
102. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,996.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 20,997. The court noted that the SBA never took "legal or equitable title to
the site." Id.
108. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,996.
109. Id.
110. Id. In addition, the purchase of life insurance and payment of dividends or advances to Turco officers required prior written SBA consent. Id. A dispute also arose in the
case out of the hiring of Charles Curtis, who replaced Horstmann as President and Chief
Operating Officer of Turco. ABT, Mellon and the Mirabiles contended that the SBA retained
Curtis to assist in the administration of Turco's SBA loan. In response, the United States
submitted an affidavit stating that Curtis was never employed by the SBA as a management
consultant. Id. No party introduced evidence to the contrary by any affidavit and the court
concluded that Turco, and not the SBA, hired Curtis. Id.
I1l. Although the Mirabiles never filed suit against the SBA, their claims against ABT
and Mellon involved the same issue as the third-party action ABT and Mellon had been commenced against the SBA. As a result, the court noted that "the major opposition to all three
motions comes from the Miabiles despite the fact that the Mirabiles have asserted no direct
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for by the agreement, the court concluded that no evidence was introduced that the day-to-day managerial involvement required by
SBA loan ever took place." 2 Consistent with its decision granting
summary judgement for ABT, the court declared that "participation
in purely financial aspects of a borrower's operation [was insufficient] to bring a lender within the scope of CERCLA liability." ' " 3
Therefore, the motion of SBA for summary judgement was
granted.14
The court declared, however, that the motion of Mellon
"presents a cloudier situation."" 5 The court's concern arose out of
the participation of Mellon and its predecessor, Girard, on the Turco
advisory board. For example, McWilliams testified that "he became
involved with Turco because his superiors at Mellow wanted him to
have 'more of a day-to-day hands-on involvement.' "I" He described
this involvement as taking the form of "monitoring the cash collateral accounts, insuring that receivables went to the proper account,
and establishing a reporting system between [Turco] and the
bank."' 1 7
In addition, evidence was offered that Girard had demanded
that "additional sales efforts"'" 8 be made by Turco and that McWilliams insisted, on several occasions, that Turco make certain "manufacturing changes and reassignment of personnel.""' 9 A member of
Turco's advisory board testified that "it seemed for a period of time
as if McWilliams was always present at the site"'2 0 and stated that
"McWilliams would, for example, determine the order in which orclaim against the SBA." 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,995. The Mirabiles claimed that in placing
restrictions on the use of loan proceeds, the SBA "may have failed to prevent Turco from
disposing of alleged hazardous substances on the site." Id. at 20,997. The court rejected this
argument, noting that nothing in CERCLA or case law suggests that a lender must ensure
that its loan proceeds are applied to cleanup costs. Id.
112. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,997.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. This purely financial involvement, according to the court, would not give rise to
CERCLA liability. Id. In addition, the court found nothing in the participation of Sauers on
the advisory board of Turco that rose above the level of "general financial advice." Id.
118. Id. This followed a point at which Curtis, who succeeded Horstmann as President
and Chief Operating Officer of Turco. testified that Girard Bank, Mellon's predecessor in interest, "became more heavily involved in the day-to-day operation of Turco." Id.
119. Id. (Testimony of Curtis).
120. Id. (Testimony of Dick Fitch, a member of the Turco Advisory Board. Fitch later
clarified his testimony to state that McWilliams visited the plant perhaps once a week.)
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ders were filled. 121
Although it noted that there were weaknesses in the case which
the Mirabiles had presented against Mellon,1 2 the above-testimony
convinced the court that a full factual record at trial was necessary
in order to reach a determination as to whether Mellon, through its
predecessor Girard, engaged in the sort of participation and management that would bring it within the scope of CERCLA liability. 12 3
In particular, the court requested a clearer picture of McWilliams'
participation in the manufacturing processes.12 4 As a result, Mellon's
motion for summary judgement was denied. 2 5
B.

United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.

In United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co. 2 6 the United
States District Court for the District of Maryland also considered
the liability of lending institutions under CERCLA. Unlike the court
in Mirabile, the Maryland Bank court focused on the liability of a
lending institution as an "owner," as opposed to an "operator," of a
facility under CERCLA.
In 1980, Mark Wayne McCleod ("McCleod") applied for a
$335,000 loan from Maryland Bank & Bank Trust Co. ("MB&T")
to acquire a 117 acre farm from his parents.1 27 MB&T issued the
loan and McCleod purchased the site on December 16, 1989.128 Soon
thereafter, he failed to make payments on the loan, and MB&T instituted a foreclosure action, 1 29 purchased the property at the fore121. Id.
122. "The reed upon which the Mirabiles seek to impose liability is slender indeed
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
127. Id. McCleod's parents, Herschel McCleod, Sr. and Nellie McCleod, owned the
property from July 7, 1944 until December 16, 1980. Id. Herschel McCleod, Sr. operated two
businesses known as Greater St. Mary's Disposal, Inc. and Waldorf Sanitation of St. Mary's
Inc. Id. During 1972 or 1973, Herschel McCleod, Sr. permitted the dumping of hazardous
wastes at the site later purchased by his son. Id. The wastes included organic chemicals such
as toluene, ethylbenzene, xylene and heavy metals such as lead, chromium, mercury, and zinc.
Id.
128. Id. Ninety percent of the loan was guaranteed by the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA). Id. The MB&T filed a counterclaim against the FmHA alleging that the
FmHA shared responsibility for the cleanup costs because FmHA compelled MB&T to foreclose and bid on the property. Id. at 575, n. 1, 580, n.8. The United States, on behalf of the
FmHA counterclaimed against MB&T for misrepresentation in securing the loan guarantees
from the FmHA. Id. at 575, n.l. The parties later moved jointly to dismiss the counterclaims
with prejudice. Id.
129. Id.
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closure sale on May 15, 1982, and took title to the site."' 0
On June 20, 1983, McCleod informed the County Department
of Helth of the existence of waste deposited at the site.133 The State
of Maryland inspected the property the next day and then contacted
the EPA.13 2 After conducting tests to identify the substances
dumped at the site, the EPA requested and received funding to conduct a removal action under the Superfund. 33 The agency MB&T
that it had to initiate corrective action at the site before October 24
134
1983 or the EPA would use its own funds to remove the waste.
After the bank declined the EPA's offer, the agency instituted its
own cleanup, removing 237 drums of chemical material and 1,180
tons of contaminated soil at an estimated cost of $551,713.50.1 After MB&T failed to tender payment for the cleanup costs, the
36
United States instituted a civil action for their recovery.
The court's decision arose out of a motion for summary judgement filed by MB&T. First, MB&T contended that it could not be
liable as an owner of the site unless it was also an operator of the
130. Id. MB&T bid $381,5000.00 for the site, well in excess of the original amount of
its loan. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. For more information on removal actions, see supra note 91.
134. CERCLA provides in § 104(a)(l) (42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(a)(1) (West 1986)) that
the President is authorized to act . . . to remove or arrange for the removal of, and
provide for remedial action relating to [any] hazardous substance, pollutant or contaminant at any time . . . unless the President determines that such removal and
remedial action will be done properly by the owner or operator of the vessel or
facility from which the release or threat of release emanates, or by any other responsible parties.
Several CERCLA defendants have seized upon this language and argued that where the owner
or operator was not allowed the first chance at cleanup, CERCLA had been violated and the
government's cleanup costs are unreasonable per se. However, this argument has been rejected
insofar as CERCLA was recognized as contemplating emergency removal actions in which
prior notification of and consultation with the owner or operator is not feasible. United States
v. Dickerson, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1875, 1880 (D. Md. May 28, 1986). Consequently, courts
have ruled that CERCLA merely encourages, rather than compels, notification of and cleanup
by the responsible party. United States v. Medley, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1858, 1860 (D.S.C.
July 8, 1986). SARA solved the dilemma once and for all by amending the provision to make
it clear the act was discretionary:
When the President determines that such action will be done properly and promptly
by the owner and operator of the facility or vessel or by any other responsible party,
the President may allow such person to carry out the action, conduct the remedial
investigation, or conduct the feasibility study . . ..
42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(a)(1) (West Supp. 1988).
135. 632 F. Supp. at 575-76.
136. Id. at 576.
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site." 7 Additionally, MB&T asserted that since McLeod had done
all the dumping, MB&T was insulated from liability by CERCLA's
third-party defense.' 38 Finally, MB&T relied on Mirabile to argue
that it held indicia of ownership only to protect its security interest
in the property and did not participate in the management of the
site-the same grounds that excused ABT and the SBA from liability in Mirabile.139
The court made quick work of MB&T's first contention. Although CERCLA § 107(a)(1) by its terms applies only to "owners
and operators," 10 the court declared that MB&T could still be held
liable under the section as an owner even if it did not also operate
the site.'" To rule otherwise, stated the court, would require it to
"slavishly follow the laws of grammar while interpreting acts of
Congress" and "would violate sound canons of statutory interpretation." 2 The legislative history of CERCLA, according to the court,
provided strong evidence that Congress intended liability for owners
and operators to be distinct and separate. 43
The court also rejected MB&T's argument that it was entitled
137. Id. The United States disputed the claim that MB&T was not an "operator" of the
facility. Id. at 577.
138. 632 F. Supp. at 576. For a discussion of the CERCLA third party defense, see
supra note 62.
139. See id. at 578.
140. See supra note 2.
141. 632 F. Supp. at 577.
142. Id. at 578. The court was particularly swayed by the fact that CERCLA is widely
acknowledged to be model of ambiguity, due in part to the fact that it was a "hastily patched
together compromise Act." Id. United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D.N.H.
1985) ("CERCLA has acquired a well-deserved notoriety for vaguely-drafted provisions and
an indefinite, if not contradictory, legislative history." See also Bulk Distribution Centers, Inc.
v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1441, (S.D. Fla. 1984) ("CERCLA's legislative history
is riddled with uncertainty because lawmakers hastily drafted the bill, and because last minute
compromises forced changes that went largely unexplained."); City of Philadelphia v Stepan
Chemical Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1142 (E.D. Pa. 1982) ("What was enacted and signed into
law is a severely diminished piece of compromise legislation from which a number of significant features were deleted.").
143. 632 F. Supp. at 578. The court examined the House Report accompanying H.R.
85, one of the four bills to coalesce into CERCLA. The report contained a definition of "operator": "In the case of a facility, an 'operator' is defined to be a person who is carrying out
operational functions for the owner of the facility pursuant to an appropriate agreement." 632
F. Supp. at 578, citing H.R. Rep. No. 96-172, Part I, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1980
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6119, 6182. The reference to an operator working for the owner
convinced the court that "an operator cannot be the same person as an owner." Id.
The court also cited to State of New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir.
1985) in which an owner of a site who had bought the site for development and had never
operated it was still held liable under CERCLA.
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to the "security interest" exception of CERCLA § 101(20)(A). To
arrive at this conclusion, the court reviewed the law of Maryland
and twelve other states, under which a lending institution that possesses a mortgage as security for an obligation actually holds title to
the property while the mortgage is in force. 4 4 The court stated that
the language of § 101(20)(A) was limited to these situations since
ownership in the property was in the hands of the lender by operation of law.' 4 5
In support of this interpretation, the court cited the legislative
history of the Comprehensive Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act, one of the four proposed bills out of which CERCLA
emerged. 4 Contained in a house report accompanying the proposed
bill was a definition of "owner."' 4 7 The term excluded "certain persons possessing indicia of ownership (such as a financial institution),
who, without participating in the management or operation of a vessel or facility, hold title either in order to secure a loan or in connection with a lease financing arrangement under the appropriate
banking laws, rules or regulations." '48 The purpose of CERCLA was
to protect only those lenders in the thirteen states who hold title as
secured parties as a matter of law, and not mortgagees who acquire
title in other ways-such as at a sheriff's foreclosure sale.1" 9
As a consequence, the court ruled that MB&T's security interest existed only so long as its mortgage was in effect. 5 During this
period it could avail itself of the defense contained in § 101(20)(A).
However, when it foreclosed on the mortgage its security interest
was terminated, along with the mortgage.' When cleanup occurred,
MB&T did not "hold" a mere security interest, but "held" title to
the property as the owner of an investment.' 5 2 Based on its finding
that the verb tense of the exclusionary language was critical, the
court denied application of the "security interest exception" to
144.
145.
146.
147.

632 F. Supp. at 579 (citing, inter alia 58 C.J.S. Mortgages § I, at 23-28 (19).
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing H.R. REP. 96-172, Part 1, 2 CERCLA Leg. Hist., supra note 38, at

546).
148. 632 F. Supp. at 579-80. See supra note 64.
149. Id. at 580. The court suggested that MB&T could have been entitled to this exception had it not foreclosed on the site or had it withheld from bidding at the foreclosure sale. Id.
at 580, n.6.
150. Id. at 579.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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MB&T.153
Confronted with MB&T's reliance on Mirabile, the court found
that case to be distinguishable." 4 The court stated that in Mirabile,
ABT's foreclosure was "plainly undertaken in an effort to protect its
security interest in the property," once again suggesting that MB&T
had acted as the owner of an investment.' 56 As further evidence, the
court noted that ABT "promptly" assigned the property to a third
party,16 6 while MB&T had owned the McLeod site for almost four
years at the time the court rendered its decision. 5 The Maryland
Bank disagreed that Mirabile had a broader application and limited
1 58
the case to its facts.
Having quashed MB&T's attempt to avoid liability in the same
manner as ABT and the SBA had accomplished in Mirabile, the
court concluded the opinion by offering MB&T a glimmer of hope.
A full trial on the facts of the third-party defense was ordered.' 59
The court could not rule, based on the affidavits submitted in support
of and opposition to the motion, on "the full nature of the contractual and business relations" between McLeod and MB&T and requested the development of a factual record at trial.'
III.
A.

ANALYSIS

Harmonizing Mirabile and Maryland Bank

In Mirabile, ABT and the SBA walked away without any liability and Mellon very nearly so; in Maryland Bank, MB&T lost on
the same arguments that exonerated its counterparts in Mirabile. It
is therefore difficult to accept the fact that the courts in both cases
were construing and applying the same section of CERCLA. However, in reality, the decisions are simply different pieces of the same
puzzle and quite capable of being harmonized.
Section 107(a)(1) of CERCLA imposes liability on owners and
153. Id.
154. Id. at 580.
155. Id. This statement is incorrect. The Mirabile court did not concern itself with the
reasons for ABT's purchase of the property at the foreclosure site. Instead, it dealt solely with
ABT's actions prior to and after the foreclosure which might have rendered ABT liable as an
operator under CERCLA § 107(a)(l). See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
156. 632 F. Supp. at 580.
157. Id. at 579.
158. Id. at 580.
159. Id. at 581.
160. Id.
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operators of sites affected by hazardous waste.1 61 Mirabile concerned
itself solely with the "operator" portion of the § 107 (a)(I) equation.
As a result, the court limited its inquiry to the issue of whether the
participation of ABT, the SBA and Mellon in the affairs of Turco
reached such a level that any of the three could be labeled operators
of the Turco facility. The court's conclusion was not complicated:
involvement in purely financial aspects of a business does not render
a lender liable as an "operator" under CERCLA.'6 2 Indeed, it was
only Mellon's "day-to-day involvement"1 " in Turco's business, arguably one of the most basic characteristics of an operator in any
sense of the term, that gave the court pause.
Mirabile was not a case that turned on whether ABT, the SBA
and Mellon were "owners" of the Turco facility, nor should it have
been. Only one of the parties, ABT, ever held anything in the way of
an ownership interest. And while ABT's ownership interest was
short-four months-it is not the length of time that one holds title
but what takes place during the time one holds title that is crucial to
CERCLA liability. ABT's status under CERCLA was that of a former owner that held title during a period when no hazardous waste
was disposed of at the Turco site. This is the limited exception to
liability that CERCLA allows under § 107(a)(2): former owners are
liable only if hazardous waste was disposed of at the facility during
their term of ownership. 6 4 ABT could therefore never be held liable
as an owner under CERCLA, and the court was correct to limit its
review to ABT's status as a § 107(a)(1) operator.' 65
Once it brushed aside the contention that one had to be both an
owner and operator to be subject to CERCLA liability, the court in
Maryland Bank never concerned itself with whether MB&T was a §
107(a)(1) operator, and with good reason. MB&T clearly owned the
property in question and had assumed many of the duties and obligations of ownership.' 6 6 Unlike ABT, its ownership liability was unfettered; it was the current, as opposed to the former, owner of the
facility. CERCLA does not impose any limitation on the liability of
161. See supra note 2 and accompanying discussion.
162. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,996.
163. Id. at 20,997.
164. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
165. Id.
166. MB&T "conveyed a portion of the site to a third party, discussed granting a rightof-way across the site with another party, and retained an insurance policy on the property."
Rashby, United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.: Lender Liability Under CERCLA, 14
ECOLOGY L. Q. 569, 573 (1987).
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current owners: current owners, under § 107(a)(l), unlike former
owners under § 107(a)(2), are liable whether or not waste was disposed at the site during their term of ownership. 6 7 As a result, the
court never had to reach the issue of whether MB&T was an operator in order to resolve the liability question.
Mirabile and Maryland Bank arrive at different conclusions because they approach liability under CERCLA from different perspectives. While both cases involve lenders in a mortgage foreclosure
setting, the factual similarity ends there: Mirable is a case about
lender as operator, and Maryland Bank is a case about lender as
owner. Comparing operators and owners under CERCLA is like
comparing apples and oranges, and lenders are missing that point if
they criticize the courts for not coming to the same conclusion.
Moreover, given the different policy considerations which governed
each court in its review of CERCLA lability, it is doubtful that the
cases would have reached the same conclusion even had the courts
been dealing with the same facts.
B.

The Philosophy of Lender Liability Under CERCLA

The fundamental difference between Mirabile and Maryland
Bank concerns the manner in which each court viewed the philosophy of CERCLA liability when applied to lenders who had never
disposed of the hazardous waste which gave rise to the cases. In reviewing the policy considerations at issue, each court raised echoes of
the debate that occurred in the drafting stages of CERCLA over the
imposition of strict liability and its effect on seemingly innocent
parties.
In Mirabile, the court recognized that imposition of liability on
secured creditors or lending institutions would enhance EPA's
chances of recovering its cleanup costs, given the fact that such institutions are usually more financially solvent than other responsible
parties.1" 8 The court further acknowledged that imposing liability in
such circumstances may help to ensure more responsible management of hazardous waste sites."6 9 Nonetheless, noting that Congress
had failed to address these policy questions and had, in fact, singled
out secured creditors for protection under CERCLA § 101(20)(A),
the court declined to expand the scope of liability under
167.
168.
169.

See supra notes 52 and 53.
15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,996.
Id.
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In Maryland Bank, however, the court envisioned a scenario
under which EPA would shoulder the cost of cleanup alone, allowing
the former mortgagee-turned-owner to benefit from the cleanup by
the increased value of the land.171 Furthermore, since prospective
purchasers would shy away from a sheriff's sale bid due to potential
CERCLA liability, a lending institution could purchase the property
with a low bid and re-sell it at a handsome profit once the cleanup
had been undertaken at taxpayer's expense.' 72
The Maryland Bank court stated that it would not allow CERCLA to become an insurance "scheme" for lending institutions to
protect them against losses on loans secured by polluted properties.' 73 Intimating that MB&T had simply made a mistake in judgment, the court declared that "lending institutions are in an able
position to investigate and discover potential problems in their secured properties" and that "such research is routine for many
lenders. 1 74
To a certain extent, the decisions reflect the conflicting viewpoints expressed during the drafting of CERCLA. Mirabile can be
seen as an extension of the concern that CERCLA would result in a
fishing expedition for the deepest available pocket regardless of the
degreeof culpability. The Mirabile court held that the primary intent of the drafters of CERCLA was to punish whose who profited
from the illegal disposal of hazardous wastes and that certain innocent parties had been afforded protection from liability.1 75 Included
in this protection were lending institutions that held indicia of ownership primarily to protect a security interest and that did not participate in the management of the facility. While recognizing the advantages that would be made available to EPA if Superfund liability
were extended to the deep pockets of lending institutions, the court
in Mirabile was not willing to judicially extend the scope of liability
to such an "innocent party" absent an express directive from Congress in the way of an amendment to CERCLA.
Maryland Bank is an outgrowth of the opinion that strict liability of past and present owners under CERCLA must adhere in order
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.
632 F. Supp. at 580.
Id.
Id.
Id.
15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,996.
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for an effective cleanup scheme to be enforced. Proponents of strict
liability during CERCLA's drafting asserted that it was necessary in
order to avoid burdensome proof problems that would inevitably result in the cost of cleanup being borne by taxpayers.1 7 The court in
Maryland Bank rejected the arguments of MB&T that it was not
responsible for the presence of hazardous waste at the site and based
liability under CERCLA solely on its status as the present owner of
the property. 177 Had the result been otherwise, it is clear that McCleod, who was unable to make the payments on his loan, would not
have been able to meet the cost of cleanup. Therefore, EPA would
have been faced with a result under CERCLA no better than was
available to remedy the Love Canal disaster under RCRA. This is
the scenario that the strict liability advocates sought to avoid by enacting CERCLA.
C.

Legislative Fallout: The Innocent Landowner Defense

The reauthorization of CERCLA was well underway when the
Maryland Bank decision was handed down.1 78 During the course of
the reauthorization, the controversy surrounding "innocent party vs.
strict liability" that highlighted the drafting of CERCLA was rekindled. 179 The publicity arising from the Maryland Bank decision
added impetus to the call for protection of innocent parties from the
ever-increasing scope of CERCLA's strict liability scheme. 8 ' The
culmination of these efforts took the form of the so-called "innocent
landowner" '8 1 defense embodied in the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"). 8 2
In reality, the innocent landowner defense is not a separate defense at all. It is instead an adjunct to CERCLA's § 107(b)(3)
third-party defense.183 Section 107(b)(3) of CERCLA provides a defense if a potentially responsible party can prove that the release or
threat of a release of a hazardous substance and the damages resulting therefrom were caused solely by a third party with whom the
176. See note 38 supra.
177. Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. at 577.
178. CERCLA's reauthorization was necessary due to the expiration of the taxing system established to finance the cleanup fund. Superfund 11:A New Mandate, (BNA) 13 (Feb.
13, 1987) [hereinafter Superfund Il].
179. Superfund II, supra note 176, at 28.
180. Id.
181. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601(35)(A)-(D) (West Supp. 1988).
182. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
183. See supra note 62.
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defendant had no contractual relationship.' 84 SARA amended the
definition of the terms "contractual relationship" to provide that a
contractual relationship will not result in liability if a defendant acquired the facility after the disposal of hazardous substances and, at
the time the facility was acquired, the defendant did not know and
had no reason to know that any hazardous substance was disposed of
85
in, on or at the facility.1
However, in defining when a defendant "had no reason to
know" that any hazardous substance was in, on or at the facility,
SARA adopted a standard of research remarkably similar to that
espoused by the court in Maryland Bank. 8 6 The innocent landowner
defense is applicable only to those defendants who undertook, at the
time of acquisition, "all appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and uses of the property consistent with good commercial or
customary practice in an effort to minimize liability. 87 In reviewing
the level of inquiry that is "appropriate," SARA requires courts to
take into account several factors:
[(l)]any specialized knowledge or experience on the part of the defendant [; (2)]the relationship of the purchase price to the value of
the property if uncontaminated [; (3)]commonly known or reasonably ascertainable information about the property [; (4)]the obviousness of the presence or likely presence of contamination at the
property[;] and [; (5)]the ability to detect such contamination by
184. Id.
185. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1988). The subsection provides as
follows:
The term "contractual relationship", for the purpose of section 9607(b)(3) of this
title includes, but is not limited to, land contracts, deeds or others instruments transferring title or possession, unless the real property on which the facility concerned is
located was acquired by the defendant after the disposal or placement of the hazardous substance on, in, or at the facility, and one or more of the circumstances
described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) is also established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence:
(i) At the time the defendant acquired the facility the defendant did not know and
had no reason to know that any hazardous substance which is the subject of the
release or threatened release was disposed of on, in or at the facility.
(ii) The defendant is a government entity which acquired the facility by escheat, or
through any other involuntary transfer or acquisition, or through the exercise of
eminent domain authority by purchase or condemnation.
(iii) The defendant acquired the facility by inheritance or bequest.
In addition to establishing the foregoing, the defendant must establish that he has
satisfied the requirements of section 9607(b)(3)(a) and (b) or this title.
186. 632 F. Supp. at 580.
187. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(B) (West Supp. 1988).
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To date, the innocent landowner provision has spawned little in
the way of judicial interpretation." 9 There is no reported decision
that discusses application of the defense in the context of a lender
liability under CERCLA.
D.

The Implications of Mirable, Maryland Bank, and the
Innocent Landowner Defense for Lenders

The lessons of Mirabile and Maryland Bank for lending institutions may be painful, but there are at least simple to understand and
should be easy to follow. However, lenders ought not feel secure that
the innocent landowner defense provides a safe harbor from CERCLA liability. In many way, lenders should view the defense with a
"once bitten,twice shy" attitude: any potential liability under CERCLA must be viewed carefully, regardless of the existence of a possible defense.
Mirabile counsels lenders to avoid environmental liability as operators of hazardous waste facilities by steering clear of day-to-day
involvement in the management of their borrowers' concerns. However, the emergence of huge money judgments for lender liability in
non-environmental matters arising out of interference by lenders in
the affairs of borrowers has ensured that this type of conduct will
become increasingly rare, if non-existent, on the part of lenders.190
As a result, Mirabile should not really change the way lenders do
business; rather, it should impress upon lenders the dangers of straying too far from the normal lender-borrower relationship.
The key, according to the court in Mirabile, is to focus on
whether the actions contemplated by the lender "constitute partici188. Id.
189. Reliance on the defense was rejected in the only reported case to date. In Washington v. Time Oil Co., 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2076 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 19, 1988), the court
deferred its holding on whether defendant "Time Oil know, or had reason to know, if the
property was contaminated at the time of purchase." Id. Instead, the court found that Time
Oil had failed to satisfy the other elements of CERCLA § 107(b)(3); namely, that the release
of the hazardous substance in question was caused solely by a third party with whom Time Oil
had no contractual relationship. Id. The court ruled that a sublessee of Time Oil, with whom it
had at least an "indirect contractual relationship" had caused a release of hazardous substances at the site. Id.
190. See, e.g., State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App.
1984) (judgment for borrower against lender arising out of improper control for $18 million).
For a general discussion, see Lundgren, Liability of a Creditor in a Control Relationship With
its Debtor, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 523 (1984).

HOFSTRA PROPERTY LAW JOURNAL

IVol. 2:291

pation in the management of the site."'' Under this test, ABT was
absolved because it never tried to revive Turco as a going concern; it
merely boarded up the windows, changed the locks and secured the
property until it could be transferred to a willing buyer.' 92 And, although the SBA regulations required it to provide "management assistance to its borrowers," the Mirabiles could turn up nothing more
on this issue than the fact that SBA representatives visited the Turco
93
site three times.
Even Mellon would have been entitled to summary judgment
had the only testimony on the issue been that of McWilliams. McWilliams stated at his deposition that he monitored the cash collateral accounts, ensured that receivables went into the proper accounts
and established a reporting system between the bank and the company.' Consistent with its earlier rulings, the court stated that this
1 95
purely financial activity would not give rise to CERCLA liability.
It was only when Curtis, Turco's Chief Executive Officer, brought up
two obvious examples of management-related activity completely
outside the scope of the lender's authority-McWilliams "insisted on
certain manufacturing changes and reassignment of personnel"-that the court concluded that Mellon had stepped over the
line. 19 This line should be bright enough to provide lenders with a
clear view of what will and will not suffice under CERCLA.
Unlike Mirabile, Maryland Bank should change the way lenders do business. Foreclosures will no longer be a routine method of
recouping a loss on a bad loan. Indeed, given the average CERCLA
cleanup cost of $14 million,' 9 7 most, if not all, lenders will simply
walk away from the loan rather than acquire CERCLA liability at
the same time they acquire the mortgaged premises at the sheriff's
foreclosure sale.
This should not necessarily result in a greater number of uncollectable loans. Heeding the advice of the Maryland Bank court to
"investigate and discover potential problems,"' 9 8 lenders should institute a system of environmental research that impacts on every phase
of the loan process. Lenders must require potential borrowers to an191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,996.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 20,997.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 91.
Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. at 580.
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swer an in-depth questionnaire at the time application for the loan is
made.1 99 This should be followed by an environmental audit of the
site in which all possibilities for environmental liability for the lender
are reviewed.2"0 If the investigation is satisfactory, the loan can be
made and the loan documents can contain representations and warranties allowing the lender to void the deal if misrepresentations as
to the environmental condition of the site have occurred. 0 1 If the
investigation is unsatisfactory, the application is denied.
The latter result achieves indirectly what CERCLA sought to
provide for directly. Borrowers unable to obtain finances to continue
or expand their business as a result of environmental difficulties will
be left with no choice but to remedy the ills at their own expense.
The CERCLA ideal of having "those who profit from pollution pay
for it" is thus realized-albeit in a roundabout way.
If the loan relationship ends prematurely, the process must be
repeated: before commencing a foreclosure action or accepting a
deed to any property in lieu of foreclosure, the lender should undertake environmental reconnaissance once again and obtain assurances
that is not buying into CERCLA liability by becoming an owner of
the site.202 If the environmental review is satisfactory, the lender can
proceed with the transaction, taking some comfort in the fact that its
review might enable it to utilize the innocent landowner defense in
the event of some unforeseen environmental difficulty. 0 3 If the review is unsatisfactory, the lender should simply walk away from the
loan. Given the cost of a CERCLA cleanup, few loans will be worth
the risk of liability.
The danger in all this lies somewhere in the middle, a potent
mixture of Mirabile and Maryland Bank. Given Maryland Bank's
emphasis on research, many lenders may find it necessary to review
the environmental practices of their borrowers prior to extending
further credit. In such a situation, it is conceivable that a lender
could, in the interest of avoiding future CERCLA liability, condition
the extension of credit on compliance by the borrower with certain
accepted methods of hazardous waste management and disposal. The
199. Miller & Bennett, Due Diligence Techniques for the Innocent Purchaser/Lender,3
Toxic L. Rep. (BNA) 434 (Aug. 31, 1988).
200. Id. See also Earl, Environmental Auditing: What Your Client Doesn't Know Hurts
The Most, 60 FLA. B. J. 47 (1986); Cohen, Hazardous Waste" A Threat to the Lender's
Environment, 19 U.C.C.L.J. 99, 124 (1986).
201. Cohen, supra note 200, at 124.
202. Miller & Bennett, supra note 199, at 438.
203. Id.
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rub occurs when the lender dictates the terms of the borrower's environmental compliance to the point that it begins to participate in
what is essentially a function of management. In so doing, is the
lender out of the Maryland Bank frying pan only to fall into the
Mirabile fire as an operator under CERCLA § 107(a)(1)? To date,
no court has considered this question, but it illustrates the difficult
choices faced by lenders in the area of environmental liability.
Finally, lenders should be wary of the apparent benefits of the
innocent landowner defense. In the wake of Mirabile and Maryland
Bank, and given the level of inquiry required by CERCLA §
101(35)(B), it is difficult to conceive of a situation in which lenders
could be viewed as "innocent." It is submitted that the provision is
little more than a legislative placebo; it looks good in print, but
promises to have little effect."0 4 If a mistake is made in the process
of environmental review and a lender becomes the owner of contaminated property, the lender will probably still be held liable under
CERCLA.20 5 Although the lender will have a claim against the
party that committed the error in the review, it will be of little consolation given the enormity of the cost of CERCLA liability. As a
result, lenders must be aware that not just any review will suffice;
CERCLA calls for an "appropriate inquiry"20 6 and it is suggested
that a lender focus squarely on the qualifications and experience of
any party undertaking environmental reconnaissance on its behalf.
CONCLUSION

The ultimate impact of Mirabile, Maryland Bank and the innocent landowner provision will be felt most keenly by the average citizen who pays taxes. If absolute liability is to accrue to a lender
under the Maryland Bank decision and no innocent landowner defense is available, the most likely course for a lender is to simply
204. See Strock, The Genesis of the "'Innocent Landowner" Defense, 3 Toxic L. Rep.
(BNA) 592 (Oct. 5, 1988). The author concludes that the "innocent landowner" defense provides "scant new hope" for parties facing CERCLA liability. Id. at 595.
205. In BCW Associates Ltd. v. Occidental Chemical Corp., 3 Toxic L. Rep. (BNA)
943 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 30, 1988), the CERCLA § 107(b)(3) third-party defense was ruled unavailable to two parties that had commissioned environmental investigations which reached
faulty conclusions. The purchaser, BCW, hired two engineering firms, and a subsequent lessee,
Knoll International, Inc., retained a technical service to perform environmental reconnaissance
on a warehouse. Id. at 944. All three environmental reviews failed to detect the presence of
lead in dust that had accumulated at the warehouse. Id. Both BCW and Knoll asserted a
third-party defense against the liability for cost of the lead cleanup, but the court ruled that
neither had exercised "due care" as required by § 107(b)(3). Id.
206. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(B) (West Supp. 1988).
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abandon its interest in the property and forego acquiring ownership
through foreclosure. In such a situation, the cost of cleanup will obviously not be borne by a borrower that was unable to meet even the
monthly mortgage payment to the lending institution. As a result,
EPA or state government will be forced to foot the bill for cleanup
and the ultimate responsibility will fall on the taxpayer. It will be, in
essence, "Love Canal revisited" and no greater result will attach
under CERCLA than was achieved under RCRA. In conclusion,
therefore, expanding CERCLA liability to lenders is not the deeppocket windfall it seemed to be at first blush: while it has no doubt
expanded the scope of parties liable under CERCLA, it may have
guaranteed that the country will face many more situations that
CERCLA was specifically drafted to avoid.

